I have highlighted passages in red that I have
felt particularly relevant to Padeswood. They should not be read in isolation
but rather taken as indicators of important points and then read around.
They are not intended to be definitive but
simply an aid to navigation.
Report by Peak Associates Environmental Consultants
Ltd
Commissioned by Friends
of the Earth, London
March 2000
The Environmental Impact and the Public's Perception
of
The Effectiveness of Integrated Pollution Control
At Castle Cement Clitheroe Lancs
CONTENTS
Page No
1) Introduction, Aims and Objectives
2
2) Executive Summary
3
3) History
Of Integrated Pollution Control at the site
3.1) Previous Authorisations
and Limits
5
3.2) Current Authorisation and
Limits
6
3.3) Future Trials and Limits
7
3.4) Overview of Public
Concerns and Complaints
8
3.5) Work Done To Overcome
These Concerns
8
4) Environmental
Performance From 1996 to April 1999
4.1) Annual Figures For
1996 1997 and 1998
9
4.2) Monthly
Returns and Unauthorised Releases Reported
9
4.3) Ranking
and Causes of Releases Notified To The Environment Agency
10
5) Public Complaints
5.1) Analysis Of
Data and Correlation With Notified Releases
12
5.2) Possible Reasons For Poor
Correlation
12
6) Review of Improvement
Conditions and Enforcement Action
6.1) Improvement Conditions
14
6.2) Enforcement Action
14
7 ) Public Concerns For The Future
17
8) Conclusions
19
9) Recommendations
For Future Regulation Of The Site
21
10) References
23
1) Introduction,
Aims and Objectives
Castle Cement Limited are members of the Scancem Group which in turn
is owned by Heidelberger Zemant. They operate three cement kilns at Clitheroe.
Cement production involves heating the raw materials (limestone, shale,
sand, iron oxide and fly ash) to some 1400 degrees Celsius in a rotating
kiln. The process is therefore an energy intensive process. As the cost
of producing energy increased in the 1980's the cement industry looked
to what are termed alternative fuels and substitute fuels in order to minimise
costs. Environmentalists have campaigned against the use of such alternative
fuels and substitute fuels. Concerns are centred on the potential for increased
emissions of pollutants from these fuels, the associated lower calorific
values and in the case of substitute fuels the concentrations of waste
organic solvents and metals that are present in the waste streams that
make up the fuels.
Castle Cement Ltd have used their own substitute fuel called Cemfuel
at Clitheroe since 1992. The burning of Cemfuel was subject to an Integrated
Pollution Control (IPC) application (at this time) which was granted by
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP). This original application
and all subsequent variations have been opposed by a well organised group
of local people.
This network of local people developed as a direct
result of problems experienced by local residents when the change to Cemfuel
was made. Although some complaints stem from incidents and releases
at ground level, most complaints stem from a belief that plumes from the
kilns frequently 'ground'. In such circumstances complainants then typically
experience a distinctive odour, difficulty in breathing and irritation
to the eyes, nose and throat.
At the time of the initial Authorisation HMIP imposed a number of improvement
conditions. Most of these conditions attempted to deal with the Public’s
concerns over plume grounding and the complaints being received from the
initial trial burning of Castle’s Cemfuel.
This report aims to assess if the Public's concerns
and complaints in relation to plant are justified and if the limits imposed
as part of the original IPC application, along with any subsequent variations
and improvement programmes, are adequate in terms of ensuring local air
quality is being protected. The report therefore assesses if IPC
has worked for local residents at this site.
The study has involved an assessment of the complaints made (by members
of the Public) and the reported problems that Castle Cement have filed
as unauthorised releases from 1996 to April 1999. An assessment of
the severity and causes of these unauthorised releases has also been made
and is also presented as part of this report. An
assessment of the Environment Agency's performance in relation to the enforcement
of and setting of emission limits has also been undertaken.
Finally, the report discusses the future issues that are likely to cause
public concern (in relation to the latest plans for trial burning
of Cemfuel on Kiln 7) and how the application covering this latest trial
has been dealt with by the Environment Agency.
2) Executive Summary
The study has revealed that the number of justified
public complaints that can positively be traced to this site is unusually
high. In a three year period some 472 complaints have been recorded.
This equates to a complaint every 2-3 days. Whilst members of the Public
are convinced that all these emissions are from the site, Castle Cement’s
own data indicates that at least 177 of these incidents (one per week)
originated from the site. Both figures are unusually
and unacceptably high and do not in our opinion reflect a site where Integrated
Pollution Control (IPC) can be said to have worked or be working.
Although the number of justified complaints is unusually high, the
number of unauthorised releases (times when the kilns have released emissions
that are outside the set limits and therefore unlawful) is relatively low
and is in our opinion in line with UK compliance. These twin factors of
a poor incident/complaint record has been studied in more detail.
It would be tempting to conclude that the reason for the poor correlation
is simply that HMIP and the Environment Agency have not set emission limits
that are tight enough and to some extent this is true. The kilns do not
have short term limits whereby the concentration of pollutants released
in a given 15, 30 or even 60 minute period is set. In fact, the plant only
has to meet a daily (averaged limit) and even then it is allowed to breach
this limit for two days in any given month.
Setting emission limits in this way effectively means an operator can
release any concentration of pollutants in a given 15 minute or hourly
period so long as the daily average is not exceeded. The reason for
this relaxed attitude to the setting of limits is reported (ref 1) to stem
from the HMIP guidance notes which relate to the cement industry. Changing
these notes requires Ministerial direction and this matter should be looked
at with some urgency. The failure to set short term
emission limits represents very poor enforcement practice for any process
of this scale.
The reason given for the lack of short term limits is that pollutants
from the kiln process are largely governed by variations in the raw
material used and can therefore vary from hour to hour. This
instability if anything strengthens the case for short term limits.
The limits set would need to take account of natural process variations
and would need to be more generous than the daily limit. However, better
testing and management of the raw materials stream would minimise this
relaxation. There is certainly no excuse for not
setting some form of short term emission limits on this process.
However, the failure to set such limits is not in our opinion the principal
reason for the poor correlation between unauthorised releases and public
complaints. The principal reason for the poor public complaint record is
in our opinion simply the location of the plant. The presence of nearby
hills and the siting of the plant in the valley bottom means that poor
dispersion and plume grounding are inevitable in two important weather
based scenarios:
i) When the wind is at certain speeds and directions, hills up wind of the plant will cause large scale eddies and standing waves that will bring pollutants to ground level down wind of the site. This also means some residents will be more prone to adverse conditions than others.
ii) The presence of the plant in a valley bottom leaves the stack emissions
prone to poor dispersion when there is a temperature inversion in the valley.
This is a relatively common occurrence and occurs when cooler air becomes
trapped under warmer air. It is common in winter when there is very little
wind to break up the inversion.
There is a wealth of video and photographic evidence that show the
above scenarios in action.
With the above in mind the final part of the report has looked
at the Regulators handling of the Public’s concerns over emissions from
the site. The principal criticism that can be leveled
at the Regulators (HMIP 1993-March 1996 and Environment Agency April 1996-to
present) is that they have consistently failed to appreciate the scale
of the problem in relation to justified public complaints and have not
acted to protect members of the Public. HMIP
and thence the Agency have continued to either instruct Castle or to directly
fund projects that either aim to prove that the pollutants being detected
are not injurious to health, or that the latest abatement technology will
solve the problems being experienced. Whilst there is some merit
in both approaches, the fact that a noxious smell that causes your eyes
to run is not injurious to your long term health is unlikely to calm residents
who are regularly suffer from these effects Such people should also have
a right to expect Regulators to protect their local air quality.
There is some merit to trying to resolve the problem by technical means
but the various improvement programmes that have been instigated are in
our opinion flawed, in that HMIP and the Agency have
at no time sought to make the release of a noxious emission (that is detected
off site) unlawful. Hence, whilst Castle and the Agency have clearly
been working together to resolve the problem, there has been no legal imperative
for the projects to succeed. Once again cooperation
with industry appears to have been placed above the duty to protect local
people.
There have however been some recent changes, as the Agency have now instigated a prosecution against Castle for the breach of the ‘persistent haze and odour’ condition that was introduced in February 1997. Whilst we are concerned over the ability of the Agency to secure a prosecution (because of the wording of the condition), the Agency’s latest move should either:
i) Reveal that this condition is not enforceable at law and that the Agency needs to reword the condition.
ii) Prove that the releases being detected by the Public are unlawful
and (given that the case is due to be heard at Crown Court) force the Agency
to close the plant if the latest abatement (filter) does not work.
Whilst the Agency’s latest stance is therefore to be applauded,
local residents will need to be assured that the Agency’s recent and much
publicised ‘get tough’ stance will be carried through in practice.
The Agency also deserve some degree of credit for their recent improvements
in consultation. The latest trial with the latest scrubber (on kiln 7)
has been the subject of a much wider and more detailed consultation process.
The results of this exercise are not yet fully known but the
results of this consultation and the court case will be definitive
landmarks for the Agency’s attitude to enforcement in the UK and the introduction
of Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC).
There are however still improvements required in matters such as the
basic setting of limits, ensuring the wording of Authorisations are
clear and legally binding and a better and transparent way of handling
of complaints such that people are aware of how there complaint is being
investigated. A list of recommendations is included as section 9 of this
report. Although the Agency are keen to suggest that they have moved on
and are firmer Regulator than HMIP, many of the staff
involved in IPC are ex HMIP staff and hold on to many of that Regulators
pro industry values. The culture of change at the Agency is still
in need of implementation and the problems
at Castle are a good case study of what can happen when regulation is ineffective
and too industry focused.
3) History Of Integrated Pollution Control at the site
3.1)
Previous Authorisations and Limits
The initial IPC application to burn the replacement fuel known Cemfuel
was made in February 1993. Trial burning of Cemfuel was however already
taking place on kiln 5 by this date. Although this initial application
to HMIP was withdrawn it was replaced with a revised application (that
argued that the burning of Cemfuel was an existing part of the process)
that when granted became Authorisation Number AI 2813 (granted 30/11/93).
A summary of the authorizations and variations that have been in force
since this data are presented as Table 1.
The main purpose of this initial withdrawal appears to have been to
facilitate an agreement that the 'trial burning' of Cemfuel at 25% of capacity
was an existing part of the process. This and the
later handling of the granting of permission for kiln 7 to burn Cemfuel
without a new application led to an initial degree of mistrust (by members
of the Public) towards HMIP in its dealings with Castle Cement.
When HMIP granted the permission to burn Cemfuel (on all three kilns)
on 30/11/93 there were a number of improvements required. Although discussed
in more detail in section 6.1 most of these
improvements involved Castle Cement undertaking survey work in order for
them to better understand the emissions and environmental impacts from
the kilns. These ranged from simple matters such as the designation of
loading areas (for gas oil) to quite complicated matters such as the development
of methods to reduce sulphur dioxide levels to meet the required concentrations
specified in guidance notes. There were some 15 individual improvement
conditions listed. These along with all other improvement conditions are
summarised in Appendix 1 (1994-1995; 1996-1997;
schedules
submitted late)
The range of improvements was therefore extensive and covered a broad
range of areas where there were important gaps in understanding of how
the process emissions impacted on the Environment. It could therefore be
argued that failing to understand the mass balance for sulphur
(condition 9) or the lack of knowledge or monitoring for heavy metals (conditions
10 and 11) would have been sufficient grounds for refusal of the initial
Authorisation for burning of Cemfuel in the kilns in 1993 on the grounds
that the operator did not understand the process sufficiently.
Conversely, HMIP's policy appears to have been
to accept the principal of burning replacement fuel and to try to mitigate
the impacts by requiring greater and greater degrees of modeling and abatement.
HMIP did however reverse their decision on the burning of Cemfuel on kiln
7 on 20/9/94. The reason given to Castle was that there were too many incidents
of poor dispersion occurring from the kiln 7 chimney.
The picture gleaned from the Public Register records for 1993 and 1994
is therefore one of a Regulator struggling to balance its duty to the operator
and the environment and in the case of kiln 7 misjudging the case for using
a replacement fuel by granting and subsequently revoking a permission to
burn Cemfuel on kiln 7. With hindsight it is clear
that HMIP did not apply the 'precautionary principal' when granting the
original permission for kiln 7 and approved a wholly unsatisfactory process.
In commenting on the situation (at kiln 7) in 1994, Mr. Coulburn, the
IPC inspector for the site recently stated in a letter dated 13th July
1999, ‘Kiln 7 chimney was originally 77 metres in height which is only
slightly above the height of the pre heater tower. This configuration would
inevitably make the plume liable to downwashing and so promote elevated
ground level concentrations of pollutants.’ The important factor to note
from this most recent comment is that Regulators
do make mistakes and that occasionally they will eventually admit that
they have erred in granting a permission.
HMIP was merged into the Environment Agency in April 1996 and
the granting of variation AR 9435 was their
last major revision of the IPC authorisation for the site. This variation
specifically states that it replaces all the terms and conditions of the
previous Authorisation. Since the creation of the Environment Agency in
April 1996 there have been 4 process variations. Most of these variations
have involved relatively minor process issues. However variation AX6273
imposed conditions relating to off site impact in relation to haze and
odour. These conditions are discussed further in section 3.2.
The latest variation decision which once more permits Castle to burn
Cemfuel in kiln 7, has attracted far more interest and is considered further
in section 3.3. The Agency's handling
of this latest variation has also been considered in more detail in section
3.3.
3.2) Current Authorisation
and Limits
The main limits that are currently in force are summarised in Table
2. Most of these are derived from Authorisation Number AR9435
and therefore date to January 1996.
Whilst this Authorisation clearly identifies (Section 8.1) that the
operator must submit proposals to deal with the problem of poor plume dispersion,
the issue of poor dispersion and plume grounding continues to dog this
site. None of the existing conditions actually prevent
or make it unlawful for exhaust gasses to reach ground level at levels
capable of causing public complaint and nuisance. It is this failing that
leads to the majority of public complaints.
Indeed one of the most surprising issues with
the existing limits is that the Agency have not set hourly or half hourly
(i.e. short term limits) for the principal pollutants such as particulates
or oxides of sulphur or nitrogen (SOX and NOX). The particulate,
SOX and NOX limits are in fact set such that the kilns receive two days
grace each and every month by the way in which the limits for the ‘Daily
Means’ have been set.
Although not specified in authorisation AR 9435, from conversations
with the Agency (ref 2) we are informed that the concentrations of particulates,
SOX and NOX are logged continuously, these readings are then averaged every
10 minutes. These 10 minute averages are then themselves averaged over
24 hours to determine the ‘Daily Mean’. The kilns then only exceed their
authorised limits if this daily mean is exceeded for more than 2 consecutive
days in any calendar month. There is a further limit termed the ‘Peak Daily
Mean’ which is a daily limit. There are however no short term (for example
hourly) limits set for the site. This failure to
set limits on an hourly (or similar) basis, is in our opinion an oversight
that is likely to increase the chance of releases that would cause complaint
and is unusually relaxed in terms of limits placed on other similar processes
such as combustion plants.
It would therefore be theoretically possible
for the operator to run the process well within the daily consent levels
for say 23 hours and then extremely badly for an hour without breaching
the current authorisation. Although there is no firm evidence to
show that Castle Cement have attempted to exploit this, it is surprising
that the Environment Agency have not closed such a glaring loophole. Most
public complaints stem from short term events when poor dispersion or plume
grounding has resulted in pollutants reaching ground level. This loop hole
is discussed further in section 3.3.
This matter has been put to the Environment Agency (ref 1). The
lack of hourly or half hourly limits stems from the initial guidance given
to IPC inspectors in their guidance notes for the cement industry. These
note that kilns are inherently more unstable than installations such as
power stations. This instability stems from the kiln
process and the variability of the raw materials. This guidance,
which dates to 1993, has to be regarded as suspect for kilns burning substitute
fuels. Although hourly limits would need to take account of 'natural' variations
caused by variations in the rock used, the lack of
any such hourly conditions in effect make short term polluting discharges
(from poor operation of the process) perfectly legal.
The latest process variation also introduces the concept of using 'cement
wastes' to replace a proportion of the virgin rock and shale used. Whilst
this is to be applauded as a concept, the failure to introduce guidance
that ensures hourly (or more frequent limits) are placed on such operations
means that more polluting wastes could be added to
the kilns at certain times of any given day in order to use up any unused
polluting capacity allowed by the daily mean. This is discussed
further in section 3.3.
We are also concerned that the location of the automatic monitors and
the methodology covering the calculation of the ‘Daily and Peak Daily Mean’
have not been set in the current Authorisation. Conditions providing for
such an agreed method were revoked by AR 9435 (page 2) and we can find
no replacement conditions that state how, where and by what calculation
the Daily and Peak Daily Mean are to be derived. We
are therefore concerned that either documentation is missing from the Register
or someone has forgotten to include the methodology for calculating these
means. This would in effect invalidate the
daily limit and render the authorisation useless.
We are also concerned that the conditions introduced on 13/2/97, introducing
the requirement that the kilns must not 'cause persistent haze or odour'
at ground level is virtually unenforceable. In practice any such haze or
odour will be caused by a mixture of emissions, local weather conditions
and other sources (such as nearby industry or road traffic).
Whilst this condition clearly shows a new found commitment by the Agency
to protect local air quality, conditions relating to the cessation of burning
Cemfuel in certain weather conditions (when dispersion would be poor) may
have been more enforceable. Alternatively a condition either ‘prohibiting’
or requiring the operator to ‘take all reasonable steps’ to prevent exhaust
gasses reaching ground level (outside of the site's perimeter) would in
our lawyer’s view be more enforceable. A court case over the haze and odour
condition is pending and its result will be viewed with interest.
3.3) Future Trials and Limits
The latest variation for the site (BE7516)
involves the reintroduction of Cemfuel in Kiln 7 at up to 40% substitution.
This was prohibited in September 1994 by variation AN
7341. HMIP removed the permission in 1994 because of, 'continuing concerns
over poor dispersion' from the kiln 7 chimney. The decision to withdraw
the permission to burn Cemfuel was reached after an unfavorable study (required
by Variation AM7800) that looked at the issues
of plume grounding and poor dispersion from kiln 7.
The trials also involve the replacement of some other raw materials
(shales) with certain types of construction waste and some recycling of
cement based waste. During the trial kilns 5 and 6 will not be permitted
to burn Cemfuel. Castle Cement have also informed the Agency that
if successful, throughput on kiln 7 will be increased and kilns 5 and 6
will be mothballed in or around 2001.
The draft Authorisation introduces new
half hourly emission limits for kiln 7. These cover particulates,
sulphur dioxide, NOX, Hydrogen Chloride, Hydrogen Fluoride and Carbon Monoxide.
The variation does not impose half hourly limits for kilns 5 and
6, it does however introduce increased frequencies of sampling and monitoring
for all three kilns. The Agency deserve some credit
for closing the loophole (on one kiln) relating to short term limits.
3.4) Overview
of Public Concerns and Complaints
The issues of plume grounding, other periods of poor plume dispersion
and unauthorised releases at ground level coupled with the detection of
off site pollution from these events are the main areas of concern. This,
coupled with the reinstatement of a once prohibited activity (the use of
cemfuel in kiln 7), has caused a large number of complaints and responses
to the proposed trial burning of Cemfuel in kiln 7.
Although the height of kiln 7's chimney was increased by some 15m in
1994, members of the Public are convinced that the local topography and
wind currents remain more crucial in terms of plume grounding and
poor dispersion. The chimney for kiln 7 is still lower than those serving
kilns 5 and 6. Our review of the Public Register and tour of the area leads
us to conclude that these concerns would appear to be justified and
that there is the potential for poorer plume dispersion from the modified
kiln 7 chimney when compared to kilns 5 and 6.
3.5) Work Done To
Overcome These Concerns
In approving the trial to burn Cemfuel in kiln 7 the Agency has clearly
placed a great deal of emphasis on the fitting of the wet scrubber to kiln
7's stack (in 1998) and the increased height of the stack. However, members
of the Public remain convinced that the increased height of the stack has
not resolved the issue of plume grounding and remain concerned that the
scrubber only removes Sulphur Dioxide and larger particulates. This being
said, the Sulphur Dioxide limit (daily mean) for kiln 7 has been set at
330 mg/m3 and this represents an impressive reduction from the original
limit of 2,300 mg/m3 set in Authorisation Number AR9435.It
is however higher than the 200 mg/m3 currently in force as a result of
variation AX6044. The particulate limit has
been cut by a more modest amount (100 to 75 mg/m3) for the trial.
The Agency have also introduced half hourly limits for the principal
pollutants and are placing a great deal of faith in their new 'haze and
odour' condition. This condition has (they acknowledge) been introduced
as a consequence of the high number of off site complaints. If the Agency's
prosecution of Castle is successful this condition should prove to be effective
in preventing further incidents during the Cemfuel trial on kiln 7.
If incidents were to continue (at the current
rate) then the Agency would have no alternative but to serve a prohibition
notice preventing the use of Cemfuel on kiln 7 and to issue further proceedings
in the Crown Court. Our only concern is that the wording of the
condition is too vague and may not enforceable at law.
4) Environmental Performance From 1996 to April 1999
4.1) Annual Figures
For 1996 1997 and 1998
A summary of the annual releases from kilns 5, 6 and 7 is presented
as Table 3. These reveal that the tonnages
of many pollutants released has been reasonably stable and vary (year by
year) by less than 10% The tonnages of particulates, carbon dioxide, carbon
monoxide and sulphur dioxide released are all reasonably stable. The tonnages
for oxides of Nitrogen (NOX), solid waste and certain metals is however
of concern. NOX emissions increased from 774 Tonnes in 1997 to 2,110 Tonnes
in 1998 and solid wastes have increased from around 19,000 Tonnes in 1994,
1995 and 1996 to 28,700 Tonnes in 1998. This latter figure is of particular
concern as Castle's arguments over the merits of recycling 'construction
waste' via kiln 7 could be questioned if the process as a whole is producing
more solid waste for landfill. The issue of increased solid waste
production was raised at our meeting with the Agency (ref 1) and they have
agreed to investigate the reasons for the increase.
The annual return data also reveals that the levels
of Cadmium, Thallium, Mercury, and other metals are increasing year on
year. Although these increases are only measured in kilograms it would
be prudent for the Agency to act to control any further increases (if these
metals are from the Cemfuel) by controlling the limits relating to Cemfuel.
4.2) Monthly Returns and Unauthorised Releases Reported
Although the majority of public complaints have
involved problems with short term emissions from the plant, the current
authorisation (no. AR 9435) fails to set any
short term (hourly or less) limits. Breaches of the limits set in
the authorisation are only therefore only reported for exceedences of the
'Average Daily Mean' or 'Peak Daily Mean' concentrations. These data are
summarised as Table 4.
Table 4 summarises the days when one or more of the limits for the
average daily mean was exceeded. Such a breach only becomes an unauthorised
(unlawful) release if the exceedence continues for more than 48 hours or
if the Peak Daily Mean (in any 24 hours) is more than 1.5 times greater
than the limit that is set for a 48 hour breach. This
is a very generous way of setting emission limits as the kilns effectively
get two days grace (with the daily limit) before the breach of the limit
becomes unlawful.
Table 4 lists all breaches of the daily limits, the unauthorised releases
are then shown in bold type face. in the final column of Table 4. Although
the daily limit (Average Daily Mean) has been exceeded 44 times since
1996, the 'two days’ grace afforded by the wording of the authorisation
means that only 10 of these 44 occurrences were actually unauthorised releases.
The inspector informs us (ref 1) that all cement
kilns are in fact authorised in this way and that it would require ministerial
instructions to vary the guidance note for the cement industry to promote
further change. The arguments for not setting short term limits and the
provision of two days grace (for daily limits) is reported to stem from
the instability of the kiln process and the natural variability of the
raw materials.
The issue of raw material variability should certainly be a factor
in setting the short term limits. It also highlights a need for testing
of raw materials for pollutant content. However, the
current practice of setting only daily limits completely fails to protect
local air quality and two recommendations are therefore made:
i) The Agency must introduce be short term limits (in the range of 15-60 minutes) in order to ensure that Castle operate and manage their kilns and related processes well at all times
ii) The granting of up to two days grace on the daily limits should
cease.
The breach of a limit due to a raw material problem should be
an mitigating factor for the Agency to take account of when dealing with
an unauthorised release, it should not be an argument that makes a polluting
discharge (from either poor management or a raw material problem) lawful.
4.3)
Ranking and Causes of Releases Notified To The Environment Agency.
As with any process the environmental impact of any unauthorised release
is largely governed by the polluting potential ( of the material released),
the quantity of material released and the duration of the release.
It is therefore possible to develop ranking or scoring systems for any
individual site that allow a release to be classified in terms of severity.
This type of ranking system is becoming increasingly common in the IPC
sector and was pioneered by Glaxo Welcom in Cumbria (ref 3) Such schemes
allow Companies to assess the scale of incidents and ultimately use the
data to drive site improvements via their Environmental Management System.
Two scoring systems were developed for this study. The first is summarised
in Table 5 and has involved a simple scoring
system based on the nature of the substances released (band 1), the size
or duration of the release (band 2) and the fate of the release (band 3).
In addition to the unauthorised releases reported via the monthly returns,
Castle Cement is also obliged to report incidents involving spillages,
out of specification Cemfuel and other plant problems via fax to the Agency.
All incidents (monthly return and fax reports) have been analysed using
the above scoring system.
The results of this analysis are presented as Tables
6, 7, and 8.
This clearly shows the classical distribution of incidents in terms of
severity. Most of the releases (43/55) are classified as minor, a smaller
number (9/55) are classified as medium and only three
out of the fifty five reported are classified as major incidents.
These incidents were:
i) Emissions in February 1997 when particulate limits were breached for 6 days and sulphur dioxide levels for 8 days. Given that the daily limits are the only limits in force on the kilns this number of days of unlawful operation is seen as excessive
ii) Emissions in January 1999 when NOX levels were exceeded for six days and particulates for two days. Once again this degree of non compliance is viewed as excessive.
iii) The spillage of Cemfuel on 29th March 1996 has been scored highly because it involved a large volume of fuel and was the subject of one off site complaint.
The reader should note that of the forty four releases identified
from the monthly returns (Table 6) only ten
were actually unlawful releases in terms of the limits set by the IPC Authorisation.
This means that since 1996 there have been a total of twenty one
unauthorised releases (reported by Castle Cement). This is not an unusually
high number of releases for an IPC process. Furthermore, the distribution
of the histogram presented as Table 8 suggests a normal pattern for these
releases i.e. Castle are reporting large and small incidents as required.
In addition to the ranking system an attempt was also made to analyse
the underlying reasons for the fifty five incidents listed in tables
6 and 7. This data is usually available
on the Public Register as a process operator is required to notify the
Environment Agency of unauthorised releases and plant breakdowns that have
the potential to cause environmental harm (Section 1.12 of the current
Authorisation). Notifications have to be made 'without delay' and have
to be faxed to the Environment Agency on a pro forma report that requires
the operator to provide fairly comprehensive details on the incident.
It has not however been possible to complete
this review as there is simply no data on the Public Register for many
of these releases. Whilst the data for one off incidents and spillages
is generally present, the data for days when the kilns have been operating
outside of the daily limits set by the Agency is simply not recorded in
this way.
Castle therefore fully comply with the notification requirement for
spillages and one off incidents, but notifications of breaches of the daily
limits (when the plant is experiencing some form of operational problem)
are only made on the monthly basis by completing the monthly return. Castle
does not therefore routinely report these operational problems by fax as
soon as they occur. As these daily limits (Average Daily Mean and Peak
Daily Mean) are the only control limits used by the Agency, it could be
argued that any breach of these limits clearly has potential to cause serious
environmental harm. The Agency would therefore clearly
be better able to regulate the site if such problems were notified by fax
(at the time of the problem), rather than several weeks after the event.
On first inspecting the Public Register for the kilns, it is soon clear
that the number of complaints from members of the
Public (in relation to poor air quality caused by emissions) is exceptionally
high. It is also clear that the method of logging complaints has
differed from time to time and that there is a very poor correlation between
the dates when complaints have been made and days when the kilns were experiencing
some sort of acknowledged operational problem.
5.1) Analysis
Of Data and Correlation With Notified Releases
Since 1996 the Agency have required Castle Cement to consider if the
emission (that gave rise to a particular complaint) could have been from
the site. These data are placed on the Public Register on a monthly basis.
Castle are required to catagorise the possibility of the release being
from the site as being either; ‘impossible’, ‘unlikely’, ‘possible’, or
‘likely’. Table 9 provides a summary of
Castle Cement’s responses from February 1996 to April 1999.
Table 9 also considers the total number
of releases (that have led to public complaint) that will therefore have
realistically come from the site. This has been done by assuming
that 25% of the ‘unlikely’ events 50% of the ‘possible’ events and 75%
of the ‘likely’ events would have been from the kilns. The reader should
note that these returns are based on Castle Cement’s own data not the views
of local residents.
This analysis (of Castle Cement’s own data) leads us to conclude that
at least 177 of the Public’s complaints concerning releases from the plant
were fully justified in the period February 1996 to April 1999.
Although members of the Public are convinced the true figure is somewhat
higher, the figure of 177 is still way above what would usually be considered
as being acceptable for a plant regulated by IPC. In the same period
the Public Register shows that the limits and conditions set by the IPC
authorisation were only breached (data from Tables
4 and 7) on a total of 17 occasions. This
clearly shows that the limits set by HMIP and the policing of these limits
by the Environment Agency has failed to protect local residents from air
pollution.
We therefore conclude that Integrated Pollution Control has demonstrably failed at this site. The limits set by the Regulator do not guarantee pollution free air for residents downwind of the site. The Agency’s latest ‘haze and odour’ condition is an attempt to redress this imbalance but this has taken in excess of five years of grassroots campaigning for the Agency to respond to this readily identifiable problem.
5.2) Possible Reasons
For Poor Correlation
Primarily, HMIP and (then from 1996) the Environment Agency have continued
to believe that the solution to the problem of plume grounding and other
periods of poor plume dispersion problem lay with a technical solution.
Raising the heights of chimneys and introducing better filters and scrubbers
has been the mainstay of attempting to deal with the cause of the Public
complaints.
In reality there is a wealth of evidence that shows that the
location of the site and the local topography of the Ribble Valley means
that certain weather conditions make plume grounding and poor dispersion
inevitable. Modeling data (refs 4,5&6) makes this fact abundantly clear
and there is a wealth of photographic and video evidence that show that
certain wind conditions and temperature inversion can cause the grounding
of pollutants.
We are therefore of the opinion that, although the failure to set hourly
emission limits has not helped matters, the principal reason for this poor
correlation is that cases of plume grounding and other periods of poor
plume dispersion are mainly caused by the local topography and local
weather conditions. Whilst the latest clause introduced by the Agency relating
to persistent haze and odour is clearly an attempt to make the occurrence
of conditions (that cause public complaint) unlawful, it may have been
more fruitful to consider limiting the burning of Cemfuel to times when
weather conditions guarantee adequate dispersion.
If such conditions cannot be predicted then the Agency should reconsider
the general principal and suitability of using Cemfuel at Clitheroe.
6) Review of Improvement Conditions and Enforcement Action
6.1) Improvement Conditions
One of the key principals of Integrated Pollution Control is that is
that all plants within a particular industrial sector are required to operate
and use the Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Cost (BATNEEC).
This principle is supposed to ensure that all plants within a particular
sector are brought up to modern standards. In practice this is done by
ensuring that the Guidance Notes issued for that industry are applied even
handedly across the UK.
In practice not all the operators of plants can meet these standards
right away and many are given time to implement improvements by the
issuing of an Improvement Schedule with the Authorisation. It is also not
unusual for this Improvement Programme to include improved environmental
monitoring or studies that the inspector considers to be prudent or necessary
in terms of quantifying the environmental impact of the plant.
When Authorisation AI2813 was granted in 1993 there were some 15 separate
improvement conditions attached to the Authorisation. This
number is more than is usual for an average plant and we have previously
commented in section 3.1
that some of these conditions (summarised in Appendix
1) could have been held to be so basic (see improvement number 9 re
sulphur) that the granting of the authorisation should have been withheld.
We have also noted in section
3.1 that the permission to burn Cemfuel on kiln 7 was revoked in September
1994 when one of the required reports confirmed plume grounding to be a
problem.
What is also unusual is that when the initial programme of reports
and modifications had been completed (by 1996) HMIP found it necessary
(by variation AR 9435) to impose a further
12 conditions for improvement and study. Since taking over regulation,
the Environment Agency have also introduced a further 11 conditions requiring
improvements.
Some of these studies and improvements are genuine responses to the
installation of new abatement equipment but a fair percentage still relate
to fairly basic matters such as a satisfactory method of sampling Cemfuel
(condition 8.19) and better storage of cement clinker (condition 8.20).
The
picture gained is therefore once again one of a Regulator struggling to
impose adequate operating conditions for the kilns some 4-5 years after
the granting of the initial authorisation in 1993.
The sheer number and nature of improvements required
leads us to question the validity of the original decision to grant
permission to burn Cemfuel in 1993.
6.2) Enforcement Action
In addition to the prosecution which the Agency is pursuing for the
breach of the ‘Haze and Odour’ condition, there have been two prosecutions
in the magistrates court and seven Enforcement Notices served on Castle
Cement since 1996. The enforcement notices are summarised in Table
12. The two prosecutions involved:
i) £5,000 fine in November 1996 for a spillage of Cemfuel on 29th March 1996.
ii) £6,500 of fines in October 1997 for breaches of Sulphur dioxide limits, particulate limits and late supply of data in February 1997.
The Agency's policy and principles on Enforcement has been the subject of a public consultation exercise and is published in their Enforcement and Prosecution Policy (ref 7). The Agency has therefore has a range of actions it can take in relation to enforcement but is keen to stress that it operates its policy on the basis of proportionality, transparency and consistency. The actions the Agency can take include:
i) Enforcement Notices; These generally require a company to improve its operation of a process or fulfill some condition of the Authorisation.
ii) Prohibition Notices; These generally require a company to cease using a particular process or part thereof.
iii) Warning Letters; These are generally used after small incidents and note that an offence has occurred but that the Agency does not consider the offence severe enough to warrant further action.
iv) Cautions; A caution is issued as a half way house between a warning letter and a prosecution. The company concerned has to admit the offence and the caution is placed on record so that it can be referred to if a subsequent offence occurs. There is however no court case.
v) Prosecution in Magistrates Court; The bulk of serious pollution incidents are dealt with in this manner. Although the fine is limited to £20,000, this is generally deemed sufficient by the Regulator unless the incident is exceptionally large or the offender has a previous conviction(s) in magistrates court.
vi) Prosecution In Crown Court; This is reserved for very
serious offences or ones involving complex legal arguments.
It can therefore be seen that the Agency have
moved from relatively low key enforcement activity to a Crown Court Prosecution.
It is also clear from that this move has not been for evidential reasons
alone. The move indicates that offences are continuing and we have therefore
looked at some of the largest incidents that have occurred on site.
This analysis also involved looking at the worst three incidents from
the ranking exercise undertaken as part of section 4.3 and the spate of
public complaints in April to May of 1998. Ranking systems such as that
used in section 4.3 are in fact very powerful tools in assessing the scale
of an incident. The results of our analysis led us
to conclude that three incidents warranted being classified as large. These
were:
i) Emissions in February 1997 when particulate limits were breached for 6 days and sulphur dioxide levels for 8 days. Given that the daily limits are the only limits in force on the kilns this number of days of unlawful operation is seen as excessive
ii) Emissions in January 1999 when NOX levels were exceeded for six days and particulates for two days. Once again this degree of non compliance is viewed as excessive.
iii) The spillage of Cemfuel on 29th March 1996 has been scored highly because it involved a large volume of fuel and was the subject of one off site complaint.
Although the exact scores given to each of these incidents is somewhat
subjective it is clear that all of the above incidents involved either
spillages of potentially polluting substances or involved long periods
where the kilns were operating unlawfully. Cross reference with table
12 and the two previous prosecutions reveals that two of the three
incidents were the subject of enforcement action (prosecution). The exception
being the emissions in January 1999.
This omission is somewhat puzzling as the number
of failures and events seem very similar to the problems in February 1997
which were prosecuted.
In terms of enforcement notices (summarised in Table
12), the notices requiring the submission of a late piece of work on
the new scrubber for kiln 7 (Notice No. 1182) and the notice relating to
an incident involving dust that was not reported (Notice No. 1184) would
in our opinion appear to be an appropriate level of enforcement response.
However, it is worth noting that three of the pieces of work required under
the latest improvement plans (see table 13) have been submitted late and
yet only one has been the subject of a notice. The notice covering an out
of batch specification of Cemfuel (Notice No. 1183) appears (at first sight)
to be an over reaction to what appears to be a one off problem. However,
it has been reported in ENDS magazine (No. 271) that the problem actually
involved 47 of the 64 batches of fuel delivered to site. If this is the
case then Castle can probably count themselves lucky
to have avoided a further prosecution.
Turning to the issue of haze and odour and the spate of complaints
in April-May of 1998. The Agency have issued three separate notices (No’s
1151, 1392 1402) that relate to breaches of this clause. On two of this
occasions, the Agency rescinded the notice issued within 24 hours. The
notices relating these incidents reveal that the notices were withdrawn
as a result of matters improving after Castle Cement had changed
the operating conditions of the kilns on the days concerned. Whilst we
would certainly consider this to be a good example effective enforcement
‘in action’, the fact that the situation was brought
under control within a matter of a few hours suggests that the Castle have
far more control over the process than the Agency have previously been
led to believe and that hourly (or even shorter term) limits could
readily be applied to the kilns operation.
Finally, we have been passed a number statements from members
of Public who complained about noxious haze and odours from the plant in
April and May of 1998. These are included in Appendix
2. Although the Agency had already issued an enforcement notice (in
relation to these problems )on the 11th April 1998 they then went to the
trouble of taking several dozen statements from individuals. We are not
aware of any caution or warning letter being issued in relation to this
matter and yet the Agency is now taking the next serious spate of incidents
to Crown Court. The Agency has told the original complainants that it considered
the Enforcement Notice issued on the 11th April 1998 to be a sufficient
response. Many of the complaints however post date the issuing of the notice
on 11th April and local residents remain confused
as to the decision of the Agency not to formally warn or caution Castle.
In conclusion there appears to be a number of
inconsistencies in the application of the Environment Agency own Enforcement
Policy. Particular emphasis needs to be given to an improved method
of informing and explaining (to members of the Public) the logic of the
decisions that are made. The failure to act on the large number of statements
collected in Appendix 2 is of particular concern. However, two of the three
major incidents (as scored by this study) have resulted in prosecutions
and the latest move to Crown Court is clearly in line with the Environment
Agency's policy.
The next logical progression, if the emissions
continue would be a prohibition notice banning the use of Cemfuel in all
three kilns.
7) Public
Concerns For The Future
The principal concern of members of the Public
is that the Environment Agency continue to believe that a technical solution
to the problems encountered by local residents in Clitheroe exists and
that the use of Cemfuel in the long term can be justified. Local
residents believe that the history of this site shows that the location
is fundamentally unsuitable for the burning of Cemfuel.
There is also a great deal of public concern over the current
prosecution, as if the prosecution fails, local people are concerned that
the Agency will be unable to prevent the reoccurrence of noxious odours
(off site) that result from emissions that are within authorised limits.
Conversely people are also concerned that if the prosecution is successful,
the Agency would be unwilling to act to prevent further breaches of the
haze and odour condition. This would in fact be relatively simple and could
be undertaken by the setting of limits or serving of a prohibition notice
during conditions when the creation of an off site haze or odour was likely.
The main problem is that these weather conditions are so frequent that
Castle would effectively be precluded from burning Cemfuel.
From our conversations and meetings with the Agency it is clear that
they are certainly placing a great deal of faith in the success of the
latest trial burning of Cemfuel on kiln 7 and the effectiveness of the
new scrubber and chimney. If these trials are
unsuccessful and do not substantially reduce the number of off site incidents,
then we are convinced that the Agency have realised that they will have
to prohibit the burning of Cemfuel or allow the pollution of the local
environment.
The ‘top ten’ concerns raised (by local residents) over the latest trials can be summarised as follows:
i) There have been numerous attempts by the Agency and Castle Cement to improve plume dispersion. These have not been successful and there is little confidence that the latest changes will work.
ii) The scrubber only removes the sulphur dioxide and the largest particles in the stack emissions (3 microns and above).
iii) There is a marked lack of real time monitoring stations in locations that have suffered the highest number of complaints. New monitoring locations should be chosen in consultation with local residents.
iv) The Agency should develop some methodology for residents to obtain samples of air. Officers often arrive after the plume has moved away and think complainants are exaggerating the problem.
v) The Agency has refused to release certain Environmental Assessments; these should be in the public domain.
vi) There are a number of incidents and releases that Castle have made that have not been investigated or dealt with properly.
vii) The ‘two days grace’ per month renders the control limits meaningless and this condition should be removed.
viii) Until recently the Agency have failed to enforce limits and conditions. They will do the same again if the trials breach the limits set.
ix) The Agency used to admit that the plumes grounded but now say they do not. There is ample photographic and video evidence to prove that they do. The Agency will not accept some people’s videos as evidence of a problem.
x) The worst ‘grounding ‘ at kiln 7 occurs when the fans are power washed. What will happen when the kiln is burning Cemfuel?.
We have concluded that many of these concerns
are justified and need to be dealt with by the Agency. A regular
forum with the Agency would provide such a vehicle for discussion and resolution
of these issues. Although the latest consultation exercise for the
trial burning of Cemfuel in kiln 7 was much improved, there needs to be
a regular forum so that grievances can be raised.
Just as the Agency meets process operators on a regular basis there
should be regular meetings with local action groups and residents if there
is an acknowledged problem.
8)
Conclusions
The study has revealed that the number of justified public complaints
that can positively be traced to this site is unusually high. The
figures are in fact so high that they do not in our opinion reflect a site
where Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) can be said to have worked or
be working.
Although the number of justified complaints is unusually high, the
number of unauthorised releases (times when the kilns have released emissions
that are outside the set limits and therefore unlawful) is our opinion
in line with UK compliance.
It would be tempting to conclude that the reason for the poor correlation
is simply that HMIP and the Environment Agency have not set emission limits
that are tight enough and to some extent this is true. The kilns do not
have short term limits whereby the concentration of pollutants released
in a given 15, 30 or even 60 minute period is set.
Setting emission limits in this way effectively
means an operator can release any concentration of pollutants in a given
15 minute or hourly period so long as the daily average is not exceeded.
The reason for this relaxed attitude to the setting of limits is reported
to stem from the HMIP guidance notes that relate to the cement industry.
Changing
these notes requires Ministerial direction and this matter should be looked
at with some urgency. The failure to set short term emission limits
represents very poor enforcement practice for any process of this scale.
However, the failure to set such limits is not in our opinion the principal
reason for the poor correlation between unauthorised releases and public
complaints. The principal reason for the poor public complaint record is
in our opinion simply the location of the plant. The presence of nearby
hills and the siting of the plant in the valley bottom means that poor
dispersion and plume grounding are inevitable in two important weather
based scenarios:
i) When the wind is at certain speeds and directions, hills up wind of the plant will cause large scale eddies and standing waves that will bring pollutants to ground level down wind of the site. This also means some residents will be more prone to adverse conditions than others.
ii) The presence of the plant in a valley bottom leaves the stack emissions
prone to poor dispersion when there is a temperature inversion in the valley.
This is a relatively common occurrence and occurs when cooler air becomes
trapped under warmer air. It is common in winter when there is very little
wind to break up the inversion.
There is a wealth of video and photographic evidence that show the
above scenarios in action.
Although HMIP and the Environment Agency can be criticised for failing
to set short term limits and allowing ‘two days’ grace with the daily limits
this is not the most serious problem facing this site. The
principal criticism that can be leveled at the Regulators (HMIP 1993-March
1996 and Environment Agency April 1996-to present) is that they have consistently
failed to appreciate the scale of the problem in relation to justified
public complaints and have not acted to protect members of the Public.
HMIP and thence the Agency have continued to either instruct Castle or
to directly fund projects that either aim to prove that the pollutants
being detected are not injurious to health, or that the latest abatement
technology will solve the problems being experienced.
Whilst there is some technical merit in these approaches the
fact that a noxious smell that causes your eyes to run is not injurious
to your long term health is unlikely to calm residents who regularly suffer
from these effects. Such people should also have
a right to expect Regulators to protect their local air quality.
Whilst Castle and the Agency have clearly been working together to resolve
the problem there has been no legal imperative for the projects to succeed.
Once again cooperation with industry appears to have
been placed above the duty to protect local people.
There have however been some recent changes, as the Agency have now
instigated a prosecution against Castle for the breach of the ‘persistent
haze and odour’ condition that was introduced in February 1997. Whilst
we are concerned over the ability of the Agency to secure a prosecution
(because of the wording of the condition) the Agency’s latest move should
either:
i) Reveal that this condition is not enforceable at law and that the Agency needs to reword the condition.
ii) Prove that the releases being detected by
the Public are unlawful and (given that the case due to be heard at Crown
Court) force the Agency to close the plant if the latest abatement (filter)
does not work.
Whist the Agency’s latest stance is therefore to be applauded, local residents will need to be assured that the Agency’s recent and much publicised ‘get tough’ stance will be carried through in practice.
There are however still improvements required in matters such as the
basic setting of limits, ensuring the wording of Authorisations are
clear and legally binding and a better, transparent way of handling of
complaints such that people are aware of how their complaint is being investigated.
A list of recommendations is included as section 9 of this report.
Although the Agency are keen to suggest that
they have moved on and are a firmer Regulator than HMIP, many of the staff
involved in IPC are ex HMIP staff and hold on to many of that Regulators
pro industry values. The culture of change at the Agency is still
in need of implementation and the problems
at Castle are a good case study of what can happen when regulation is ineffective
and too industry focused.
9) Recommendations For Future Regulation Of The Site
1) Once the present legal proceedings are completed the Agency must make its stance on the issue of off site haze and odour clear. The intention to enforce the 'persistent haze and odour’ clause clearly indicates a change in attitude but does not deal with short term incidents that only effect a small area or a small number of people. Conditions prohibiting such incidents would be relatively simple to introduce.
2) Short term limits (15 minute to hourly) should be introduced on all the kilns and the ‘two days’ grace (i.e. two days of failure per month) given for compliance with the daily limit should be removed. The argument that some degree of failure must be allowed for due to variations in raw materials is not compelling. Testing of raw materials and sensible policing of a failure that is genuinely due to raw materials represents a more justifiable way forward.
3) The Agency claim that Ministerial Guidance over the introduction of short term limits is required. Whilst this may be the case, the Agency have set half hourly limits on Kiln 7 for the trials involving the burning of Cemfuel and recycling of cement based construction waste.
4) The Authorisation needs to specify how the ‘Daily Mean’ and ‘Peak Daily Mean’ are calculated. The failure to specify what data is used to calculate these two parameters and the calculations involved (from the 10 minute averages) from the automatic monitors is not obvious. Whilst the term ‘Daily Mean’ may be enforceable, we do not believe the term 'Peak Daily Mean’ has an obvious meaning and as its meaning is not specified in the Authorisation, the limit could not be enforced at law.
5) Castle Cement should be required to notify the Agency (by fax) of any process problem that is likely to lead to a breach of the daily limits as soon as they aware of the problem. The current practice of notifying the Agency via a monthly report can mean there is a delay of 6-8 weeks. Castle Cement have demonstrated that when faced with an Enforcement Notice they can make changes to the operation of the kilns that improve air quality in a matter of hours. The Agency should be informed of process problems as they arise not several weeks latter.
6) The Agency should review the reasons for the reported increase in solid waste from the process which was fairly stable at 18,700 Tonnes from 1994-1996 but has now increased to 28,700 Tonnes in 1998. This issue is of particular importance given the plans for recycling construction industry waste. The increased emissions of Cadmium and Thallium, Mercury and other Heavy Metals are also worthy of review.
7) The Agency needs to clarify how complaints are dealt with and log the views of its officers on the severity of the pollution and whether the incident was from Castle Cement or an alternative source. This incident investigation data needs to be publicly available on either a monthly or quarterly basis.
8) The Agency should review the feasibility of providing certain members of the Public a means of sampling the air when the pollution is at its worst.
9) The Agency needs to be more consistent with its Enforcement Policy. A jointly agreed method of ranking incidents (between Castle and the Agency) would aid this process as residents and Castle would be able to understand why certain actions have been taken. Our review of historic incidents clearly shows that some fairly major incidents and plant problems have gone unchecked whilst other more minor problems have been subject to enforcement.
10) Some form of joint panel or Committee should be set up so that residents
and activists can meet the Agency on a quarterly basis. The Agency routinely
meets industry on such a basis and we are convinced that such a forum would
help to build the trust that residents and local activists have in the
Agency.
10) References
Not available with the original copy of the Report.
Note: Appendix 2
This contains statements from members of the public
and whilst copies are held by CANK, Friends of the Earth have asked that
they are not published since they contain the names and addresses of the
contributors.
June 1997
Misleading the Minister
April 2000
Castle
Cement Press Release 'Castle Sets a Good Example'
DETR
Report
(Requires
an Acrobat Reader which may be freely downloaded)
